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China observers in the United States generally share two
observations on China today: that China has made impressive
progress in economic development in the past three decades, and that
China has maintained a poor human rights record since the 1989
Tiananmen Massacre. On the economic front, China overtook Japan
and became the second largest economy in 2010. In a joint study with
China‘s Development Research Center of the State Council, the
World Bank recently predicted that even if the Chinese economy
grows a third as slowly in the future, it will outstrip the United States
†
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in terms of overall GDP before 2030.1 Along with its growing
economy, China has gained more voting power in both the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and has increased
its profile in G20 meetings.2 On the human rights front, both Human
Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department reported continuous
deterioration of human rights in China.3 In its 2010 country report on
human rights, the State Department noted a ―negative trend‖ in key
areas of China‘s human rights record, including suppression of civil
society, censorship of the Internet, and violation of ethnic minorities‘
rights. The World Bank also warned in its report that China must
adopt an approach that better balances economic and social
development to sustain economic growth.
Great fear arises, however, when the above two elements are put
together. Questions about the ramifications of China‘s rise and the
future of world order are repeatedly raised. Does China represent a
totally different set of values? With its newly acquired capacity, will
China reshape the global order based on those values? These seem
particularly relevant questions given the perplexing international
order we are facing in the era of Iraq War.4 On the other hand, China
1. WORLD BANK, CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS AND CREATIVE
HIGH-INCOME SOCIETY 3 (Feb. 2012). A similar prediction was offered by Arvind
Subramanian, The Inevitable Superpower: Why China‟s Dominance Is a Sure Thing,
FOREIGN AFF., Sep.–Oct. 2011, at 66 (projecting that the gap between China and the United
States in 2030 will be similar to that between the United States and its rivals in the mid1970s, the heyday of U.S. hegemony, and greater than that between the United Kingdom and
its rivals during the halcyon days of the British Empire, in 1870), and Steven Rattner, OpEd., Will China Stumble? Don‟t Bet on It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, at A23. This is a
contrast with the ―pessimist views.‖ Salvatore Babones, The Middling Kingdom: The Hype
and the Reality of China‟s Rise, FOREIGN AFF., Sep.–Oct. 2011, at 79; SUSAN SHIRK,
FRAGILE SUPERPOWER: HOW CHINA‘S INTERNAL POLITICS COULD DERAIL ITS PEACEFUL RISE
(2007); MINXIN PEI, CHINA‘S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL
AUTOCRACY (2006).
2. In April 2010, the World Bank decided to raise China‘s voting stake from 2.78
percent to 4.42 percent, which is higher than some Western countries including Germany,
France and Britain. World Bank Gives More Clout to a Rising China, WASH. POST, Apr. 26,
2010, at A6. In November 2010, the IMF‘s board of directors decided to elevate China to
number three in voting power, above traditional IMF powers such as Germany, Britain, and
France. IMF Expands Power of Emerging Markets, Elevates China to No.3, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 2010, at A14. On the rise of the G20 meetings in global governance issues, see Alan
S. Alexandroff & John Kirton, The „Great Recession‟ and the Emergence of the G-20
Leaders‟ Summit, in RISING STATES, RISING INSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 177–95 (Alan S. Alexandroff & Andrew F. Cooper eds., 2010).
3. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, at 314–27 (2012), available at
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012 (last visit Mar. 10, 2012); U. S. DEP‘T OF STATE, 2010
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: CHINA (Apr. 11, 2011).
4. This perplexing order is reflected in the topic of a symposium hosted by the
Maryland Journal of International Law in May 2010. Multilateralism and Global Law:
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often portrays its development path as something unique, or, ―with
Chinese characteristics.‖ For some, though, Beijing‘s slogan of a
―peaceful rise‖ may sound more alarming than assuring. This phrase
may just betray the secret that there is enormous uncertainty about
the future. In other words, China‘s own rhetoric often reinforces
rather than mitigates the fear of a reshaped international order.
This article aims to challenge the way these questions are
framed. By examining human rights as an example in the area of
international law, this article argues that while China continues to be
defensive on human rights, either by overstretching the notion of
sovereignty,5 or by limiting human rights to a developmentalist point
of view, a major shift emerged in its basic legal and political strategy
in its relations with the United States on human rights after the
invasion of Iraq in 2003. It shifted from a defensive discourse to an
offensive discourse by embracing the legal norms and standards
established by existing international law and demanded that the
United States comply with them. The popular view about China in
the United States still insists on an old-fashioned conceptual
framework. It creates new fears and yet offers little new insights. The
so-called ―realism‖—characteristic of the Bush Administration‘s
political philosophy within neocon policy circles—is simply out of
touch with reality.
In this context, Professor Hungdah Chiu‘s writings on China‘s
attitude toward international law during the Vietnam War Era are
illuminating. Chiu‘s early writings were written in the midst of
heated debates about whether America should recognize Communist
China and permit the People‘s Republic to take China‘s seat in the
Evolving Conceptions of International Law and Governance, 25 MD. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2010)
(Symposium).
5. Professor James Zhaojie Li observed in 2001 that ―[t]he most recurring theme in the
Chinese human rights discourse is the primacy of state sovereignty—no state sovereignty no
human rights.‖ Li Zhaojie, Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its Relevance to the Chinese
Perspective of the Contemporary International Legal Order, 5 SING. J. INT‘L & COMP. L.
314, 324 (2001). This can be seen in the works of Professor Wang Tieya, China‘s most
prominent international law scholar:
The PRC sticks to the doctrine of sovereignty not only because China has bitter
experiences of its sovereignty being ruthlessly encroached upon by foreign
powers in the past, but that it also has the conviction that the principle of
sovereignty is the only main foundation upon which international relations and
international law can be established and developed.
Wang Tieya, International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 221
RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 290 (1990). For a discussion on the important contributions of
Wang Tieya see Zhaojie Li, Teaching, Research, and the Dissemination of International
Law in China: The Contribution of Wang Tieya, 31 CAN. Y.B. INT‘L L. 189 (1993).
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United Nations. They demonstrated an interesting struggle of a
sensitive mind, between competing identities, and between law and
politics. Chiu started his inquiry with a clear goal—to determine
Communist China‘s attitude toward international law. From all
perspectives, it looked obvious that China was a trouble maker in
1966, and the fear about China in the United States was serious.6
Legally, China was very much excluded from all major international
institutions—the United Nations in particular. But China had
detonated an atomic bomb in October 1964 and was exporting its
revolutionary ideology by supporting African and Asian
independence movements that subsequently became a powerful force
in the United Nations in supporting the People‘s Republic of China‘s
(PRC) membership. From January 1965, China even intensified
negative polemics against the United Nations with support from the
newly independent countries.7 While Chiu‘s works between 1966 and
1968 seemingly confirmed the sentiments of the Vietnam War era, a
close reading of them reveals ambiguity and doubts, as well as
personal struggles. Chiu was not alone in this period, as China
specialists in the United States—many of whom were conservative—
almost unanimously opposed the Johnson Administration‘s policy on
Vietnam. It was these doubts that led to a reexamination of Chiu‘s
original assumptions. Chiu‘s struggles in 1966–1968 shed light in
understanding a similar issue: China‘s attitude toward international
law.
Part I of this article is a careful rereading of Professor Hungdah
Chiu‘s writings in the 1966–1968 period. Part II extends Chiu‘s
insights into an ―interactional approach‖ to international law. Part III
offers an example from perhaps an unlikely field of international
law—human rights. It aims to demonstrate how an interactional
approach better explains China‘s strategic shift in human rights
discourse in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Drawing
from the analysis, Part IV concludes by offering some reflections on
the implications of this change.

6. ROSEMARY FOOT, THE PRACTICE OF POWER: US RELATIONS WITH CHINA SINCE 1949
221 (1995) (discussing U.S. intelligence assessments that China was capable of developing
weapons and fighting wars in border regions, but incapable of feeding its population or
developing an industrial economy).
7. See Byron S. Weng, Communist China‟s Changing Attitudes toward the United
Nations, 20 INT‘L ORG. 677, 696–97 (1966) (reviewing China‘s relationship with the United
Nations since 1949). Elsewhere, Weng describes China‘s efforts as a search for an
alternative to the ―imperialist‖ dominated United Nations. See generally BYRON S. WENG,
PEKING‘S UN POLICY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1971).
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CHINA‘S ―ATTITUDE‖ IN CONTEXT: 1966–1968

Between 1966 and 1968, Chiu published two articles in the
American Journal of International Law on China‘s policy in
international law: ―Communist China‘s Attitude toward International
Law,‖8 and ―Communist China‘s Attitude toward the United
Nations.‖9 Both articles were based on a meticulous survey of
literature, including statements by political figures such as Premier
Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, to the views of scholars on
international law. The 1966 article compared China‘s position on
major international law issues with those of the Soviet Union, and
came to the conclusion that Communist China was ―more dogmatic
in applying Marxist-Leninist theory to international law and less
responsive to the recent development of international law in the
Western world.‖10 The 1968 article was largely a survey of China‘s
often negative views of the United Nations in the 1960s.11
Without any context, the two articles could easily be read as an
embodiment of the sentiments of the Vietnam War period. It may
even fit well with Chiu‘s own political connection with the
Kuomintang (KMT). Chiu was born in 1936 in the Republic of China
and his father was a KMT member of the legislature. When the KMT
lost the civil war with the Communists in 1949, his family moved to
Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek. In his career as a scholar in the United
States, Chiu maintained ties to the KMT. The political ties with the
KMT may help explain the framing of Chiu‘s ―attitude‖ inquiry and
may even explain the seemingly clear claims of those two articles.
His family background and political affiliation, however, also created
ambiguity for him, and help illuminate his struggles, perhaps even
more powerfully. The ambiguity comes from two questions. First,
who speaks for Communist China? Second, who is playing politics
with international law? Chiu‘s ties with the KMT forced him to
question the clarity of his claims in the two articles.
Chiu was not the only one troubled by the two questions. He was
encouraged, influenced, pushed, and perhaps also troubled by
different people around him while working on the two articles in
1965 at Harvard Law School. A close reading of the articles shows
8. Hungdah Chiu, Communist China‟s Attitude toward International Law, 60 AM. J.
INT‘L L. 245 (1966) [hereinafter Chiu, International Law].
9. Hungdah Chiu, Communist China‟s Attitude toward the United Nations: A Legal
Analysis, 62 AM. J. INT‘L L. 20 (1968) [hereinafter Chiu, United Nations].
10. Chiu, International Law, supra note 8, at 266.
11. Chiu, United Nations, supra note 9.
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such influence and reveals his internal struggles with the two
questions. Furthermore, Chiu‘s struggles were beyond his immediate
circle. The year 1966 was a crucial moment for China specialists in
the United States because of their participation in the debate of
Vietnam War—fourteen of them were invited to the Senate Foreign
Affairs Committee to testify. The struggles of Chiu and the others in
his immediate circle were on vivid display in the Senate hearings.
A.

Chiu‟s Immediate Circle

After his college education in Taiwan, Chiu completed his
LL.M. degree at Harvard Law School in 1962. Chiu continued to
study at Harvard for his S.J.D. (Doctor of Juridical Science) under
Professor Louis B. Sohn and completed his dissertation on public
international law in 1964.12 It was probably after his dissertation that
he started working on the 1966 article as a Research Associate at
Harvard‘s East Asian Research Center during 1964–1965.
During this period, Chiu had two close associates. One was
Jerome A. Cohen, who joined the faculty at Harvard Law School in
August 1964. Chiu worked with Cohen almost immediately on the
question of China‘s attitude toward international law and was able to
produce a paper in 1966 for a seminar.13 Their collaboration gave rise
to a related but much larger project that led to the seminal twovolume book—People‟s China and International Law—which was
not published until 1974.14 Another close associate was R. Randle
Edwards, who first met Chiu in 1961 at Professor Sohn‘s class on
international law and become a close friend after. In 1961, Edwards
enrolled in the J.D. program and later became a research associate
like Chiu. Edwards closely read and edited Chiu‘s papers, and was
given a special recognition in the 1968 article.15
12. Hungdah Chiu, The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties,
and the Special Legal Aspects of the Treaties so Concluded (1964) (S.J.D. dissertation on
file with Harvard Law School Library). It was published as a monograph in 1966 in The
Hague, HUNGDAH CHIU, THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CONCLUDE
TREATIES, AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TREATIES SO CONCLUDED (1966)
[hereinafter CHIU, CAPACITY].
13. Jerome A. Cohen & Hungdah Chiu, China‘s Attitude toward International Law
(1966) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Law School Library).
14. JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE‘S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A DOCUMENTARY STUDY (1974).
15. Chiu, United Nations, supra note 9. In the Acknowledgement, Chiu thanked Edwards
for the editorial assistance to his dissertation: ―The tedious work of correcting the errors of
someone whose native tongue is not English has been undertaken by his friend, Mr. R. R.
Edwards . . . .‖ Id.
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In addition to Cohen and Edwards, two groups of people played
a significant role in the articles‘ creation. One group was
international lawyers including, Professors Richard R. Baxter and
Louis B. Sohn, and Wolfgang G. Friedmann and Richard Falk, whose
works were cited and discussed by Chiu in his 1966 article. The other
group was China specialists including John K. Fairbank, Benjamin I.
Schwartz, and A. Doak Barnett.
B.

Who Speaks for Communist China?

Chiu set out to discern Communist China‘s attitude toward
international law, and it seemed, at least at the outset, there was a
clear answer. On the surface, the two articles presented a variety of
sources to make China‘s attitude clear. They both surveyed an
emerging body of literature, between 1957 and 1965, showing
enormous interest in international law among the political leaders,
foreign policy makers, as well as leading scholars in Mao‘s China.
One aspect of Chiu‘s work was his meticulous survey of publications
from mainland China. Some of the names cited in the two articles—
such as Chou Fu-lun (Zhou Fulun), Ying T‘ao (Ying Tao), K‘ung
Meng (Kong Meng), Lin Hsin (Lin Xin)—were the younger
generation of international law theorists in Mao‘s China.16 Those
names have long been forgotten in China today. Some other names,
such as Chou Keng-sheng (Zhou Gengsheng), also cited and
discussed extensively, however, is more interesting and perhaps
intriguing.
Chiu was apparently following Zhou Gengsheng closely during
this period of time. In January 1965, Chiu had published a review of
Zhou‘s recent book, Trends in the Thought of Modern English and
American International Law, which was published in China in
1963.17 Considering the scarcity of information about China in the
United States at the time, Chiu was very well informed and up to
date. In the review, however, Zhou was introduced as ―a prominent
Communist Chinese jurist,‖ even though it was acknowledged that
Zhou was educated in Paris and ―wrote several books on international

16. Nearly twenty years after, Chen Tiqiang (or Ch‘en T‘i-ch‘iang), an international
lawyer who participated in the discussion of international law, more as a target of critiques,
reflected in great detail on this period from 1957 to 1960. Chen Tiqiang, The People‟s
Republic of China and Public International Law, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 11–15 (1984).
17. Hungdah Chiu, Book Review, 59 AM. J. INT‘L L. 170 (1965) (reviewing CHOU KENGSHENG, TRENDS IN THE THOUGHT OF MODERN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1963)).
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law which were widely used in Chinese universities in the 1930s,‖18
long before the Communists took power in China in 1949. In fact,
Zhou had first studied at Waseda University in Japan, and earned
doctoral degrees from the University of Edinburgh and the University
of Paris. But he was more than a successful textbook writer in
Republican China. Zhou was a law student in Paris in 1919 during
the Versailles Conference in Paris, when China was humiliated by the
Western powers when they refused China‘s demand that Japan return
Shandong province to China, and that Western powers relinquish
extraterritoriality, legation guards, and foreign lease holds in China.
Zhou played an active role in organizing Chinese students in Europe
to protest against the Western powers, and successfully prevented the
Chinese delegation from signing the Versailles Treaty. After his
return to China, Zhou was among the first international lawyers to
write about sovereignty as an intellectual endeavor in China‘s anticolonialism movement.
Additionally Zhou was no stranger to the KMT ruling elite.
From 1939 to 1945, Zhou spent five years in the United States,
attending the Institute of Pacific Relations Annual Conferences as a
Chinese delegate and an advisor to the Chinese delegation for
founding the United Nations. During this period, Zhou published a
pamphlet Winning the Peace in the Pacific,19 where he proposed a
regional international organization called the ―Pacific Association of
Nations‖ that included China, Soviet Russia, United States, Japan,
and other nations. During this period, Zhou was a frequent house
guest of Dr. Hu Shi, who was then Republican China‘s Ambassador
to the United States. Dr. Hu Shi did not think Zhou was a communist.
In his foreword to Zhou‘s pamphlet, Dr. Hu Shi had this to say about
Zhou as a person:
Ever since his student days, he has been a warm admirer of
the democratic institutions and ways of life of Great
Britain, the United States and the democracies of Western
Europe. His scholarship, political independence and
intellectual integrity have won him the high respect of

18. Id. at 170 n.2.
19. S. R. CHOW, WINNING THE PEACE IN THE PACIFIC: A CHINESE VIEW OF FAR EASTERN
POSTWAR P LANS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR A STABLE SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE PACIFIC AREA
(1944). An earlier statement of the ideas appeared in 1942. S. R. Chow, The Pacific after the
War, FOREIGN AFF., Oct. 1942, at 71.
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Chinese government leaders as well as of the Chinese
student world.20
In fact, a large number of well-established Western-educated
international lawyers in Republican China chose to stay on mainland
China when the Communist Party took power. Between 1949 and
1957, they were at least tolerated by the revolutionary regime.
Between 1957 and 1965, when a more radical official position
emerged, some of those Western-educated international lawyers, such
as Chen Tiqiang, were persecuted. Others, like Zhou, followed the
radical move unwillingly and stayed in power. Yet continuity with
the themes of Republican China was still there. It is reasonable to
imagine that, in the mid-1960s, when he was working on the two
articles, Chiu may well have been struck by the similarity between
―Communist China‖ and ―Free China‖ in their views on international
law. To label Zhou as a spokesman of the ―Communist China,‖
though technically correct, must have been a crude choice of words.
At Harvard, R. Randle Edwards most likely influenced Chiu.
Edwards had become interested in a similar question and was able to
write a paper in 1963 for a seminar on contemporary China taught by
John K. Fairbank.21 In that article, Edwards surveyed a rich body of
literature concerning the 1957-1960 debate in China, increasing the
profile of Zhou‘s writings. Edwards, however, did not find anything
particularly dogmatic in ―Communist‖ China‘s views on international
law: ―the PRC‘s attitude toward international law is not one of total
rejection but is selective and pragmatic, not unlike that of Western
nations.‖22 Neither was there anything particularly Chinese or
communist about this attitude:
Throughout its thirteen-year history [from its founding], the
PRC has demonstrated an ability and willingness to view
international relations in terms of international law and to
comply with such procedures of international law as it
deemed in its best interest, an attitude not dissimilar to that
of Western nations.23

20. Hu Shih, Foreword to CHOW, supra note 19, at vi.
21. Randle Edwards, The Attitude of the People‟s Republic of China toward
International Law and the United Nations, 17 PAPERS ON CHINA 235 (1963) (on file with the
Fung Library of Harvard University).
22. Id. at 235.
23. Id. at 263.
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Since Chiu set his goal in the 1966 article to determine the
―Communist‖ aspects of China‘s attitude in international law,
Edwards‘ view must have been a surprise for Chiu. As a result, they
may have had a lot of spirited discussions.24
The other influence came from Jerome A. Cohen, Chiu‘s
collaborator on People‟s China and International Law. Cohen‘s view
on the same question in this period was clearly stated in a panel
discussion in February 1967 at the American Society of International
Law, where he explained the idea of ―attitude‖:
[I]f, as it appears, the Chinese Communists regard
international law as an instrument of policy to be used
when useful, to be adapted when desirable, and to be
ignored when necessary, we should not overlook the extent
to which this attitude reflects their perception of how others
play the game.25
Some years after, in an essay reflecting on ethnocentrism in
international law, Cohen recalled this period of doing research on
China‘s ―attitude‖ toward international law:
By the late 1960s, my own research into China‘s
experiences with and attitudes toward international law had
yielded an unanticipated by-product. I had intended to
document the extent to which the theory and practice of the
[PRC] appeared distinctive in comparison with the record
of Western and other Asian countries, as well as that of
previous Chinese governments including the Chiang
Kaishek regime remaining on Taiwan. I had also expected

24. For Edwards, this was the beginning of a series of historical studies on China‘s
attitudes toward international law. In 1994, the same year Cohen reflected on ethnocentrism
in international law, Edwards concluded:
[T]hat the laws and historical records of the early and mid-Qing Dynasty (16441911) show, instead, a respect for the concept of sovereign equality of nations.
The efforts of twentieth century Chinese scholars and statesmen to move China
into the mainstream of international law and relations does not represent a sharp
break with earlier principles and practices. Rather, it builds upon a rich and
sophisticated tradition comprised of rules and practices, in many respects,
common to those sanctioned by Western international law.
R. Randle Edwards, China‟s Practice of International Law—Patterns from the Past, in
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 243, 244 (Ronald St. John MacDonald ed., 1994).
25. Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Attitudes toward International Law and Our Own, 61
AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 108, 113 (1967). See also Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese
Participation in the United Nations: Changing Realities and the Imperatives of New Policy,
65 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 1 (1971).
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to find an ―hypocrisy gap‖ between the PRC‘s principles
and practices—apparent to some degree in every nation, as
in every individual. What surprised me, however, was the
extent to which the United States also suffered from this
hypocrisy gap, demonstrated by its violation and
manipulations of international legal principles in dealing
with China‘s new revolutionary regime.26
Thus, a significant change in tone occurred in Chiu‘s 1966
article, compared with his 1965 book review. In the concluding
remarks of the 1966 article, Chiu rejected the idea that China‘s
position on international law was inherently determined by MarxismLeninism. Rather, Chiu pointed out, one has to look at the historical
context: ―[t]he bitter attack on the Western view that international
law is a law among civilized countries is obviously a reaction to the
oppressive measures which China has suffered in the past.‖27 This
became clearer in the 1968 article. There, the underlying message
was to reject any position inherently derived from China‘s political
ideology: ―It is . . . readily apparent that Peking‘s statements and
attitudes are strongly colored by deep-seated resentment at having
been barred for so long from participation in the United Nations.‖28
For Chiu, the issue did not simply go away. His struggles in the
1966 and 1968 articles may have prompted his interests in comparing
the KMT and Communist views in a book chapter published in
1972.29 Today historians have a better grasp of the fact that in the
1920s and 1940s international law was a highly contentious issue in
the political struggle between the KMT and the Communists in
China.30 But in 1972, Chiu seemed a lot more conscious of not falling
into a partisan position. He concluded that while the KMT and the
26. Jerome Alan Cohen, Ethnocentrism and the Teaching of International Law, in
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 191, 192–93 (Ronald St. John MacDonald ed., 1994)
[hereinafter Cohen, Ethnocentrism].
27. Chiu, International Law, supra note 8, at 266.
28. Chiu, United Nations, supra note 9, at 21.
29. Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese View of
Unequal Treaties, in CHINA‘S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239
(Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1972) [hereinafter Chiu, Comparison].
30. The political rivalry between the Nationalist and Communist Parties on the ―unequal
treaties‖ during the 1920s and 1940s was discussed in great detail in DONG WANG, CHINA‘S
UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (2005). Chen Tiqiang noted: ―The only
field in which Chinese international lawyers made intensive study was the question of
unequal treaties and special rights of foreign powers in China. These works had a
nationalistic ring, pursued with the hope of finding a way to put some restraint upon
imperialist oppression.‖ Chen Tiqiang, supra note 16, at 8.
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Communists shared resentments regarding the ―unequal treaties,‖
they differed in the way they challenged them. The KMT adopted a
more legalistic approach, while the Communists preferred more
political language.31 This conclusion, it seems, finally addressed his
struggles in the 1966 and 1968 articles.
C. The Politics of International Law
The second question that bothered Chiu was the distinction
between law and politics. In setting the goal of figuring out the
―attitude‖ of Communist China towards international law was the
implicit assumption that somehow international law represented the
objective, universal, and logical standards that ought to be used to
measure the behavior of Communist China in order to understand the
latter‘s ―attitude.‖ Chiu‘s conclusions in both his 1966 and 1968
articles seemed clear. Yet, the clarity is equally deceptive. A close
reading of the two articles and their contexts shows Chiu had
inescapable struggles with the very notion of international law as the
appropriate metric. The context here is his relations with two
international scholars, Louis B. Sohn and Myres McDougal.
As indicated earlier, Chiu‘s doctoral study at Harvard was with
Louis B. Sohn between 1962 and 1965. Sohn‘s intellectual focus
during this period was reflected in his collaboration with Grenville
Clark on the book World Peace through World Law,32 an influential
classic in the World Federalist peace movement. The book first
appeared in 1958, and was subsequently revised in 1960 and again in
1966—paralleling Chiu‘s study with Sohn. Chiu was apparently
influenced by Sohn in the former‘s choice of dissertation topic: ―The
Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties,‖33
31. Chiu concluded in his chapter, ―[B]oth the Nationalist and the Communist Chinese
denounce those treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as
unequal treaties, their concepts of unequal treaties differ.‖ Chiu, Comparison, supra note 29,
at 267.
32. GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW
(enlarged ed., 1966). Historian of the World Federalist movement Joseph Preston Baratta
notes that the book World Peace through World Law as ―one of the classics of the
movement.‖ JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, THE POLITICS OF WORLD FEDERATION: UNITED
NATIONS, UN REFORM, ATOMIC CONTROL 3 (2004). Sohn‘s early involvement in the World
Federalist movement includes his participation in the Dublin Conference on United Nations
in October 1945. Id. at 147–53.
33. CHIU, CAPACITY supra note 12. Chiu expressed his gratitude in his early works
thanking him for his teachings in the United Nations Law class. Hungdah Chiu, Succession
in International Organizations, 14 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 83 (1965) (―He is grateful to
Professor Louis B. Sohn . . . for the experience and training received from taking his course
on United Nations Law.‖).
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which had more to do with Sohn‘s core interests than what the
Republic of China in Taiwan needed at the time. The substance of the
dissertation clearly suggests that Chiu totally immersed himself in the
question world legal order in the manner of a competent and
sophisticated international lawyer. In the entire two-hundred page
dissertation, few references were made to China.34 Chiu was also
influenced by Sohn‘s involvement in the disarmament activities—he
wrote a seminar paper on China‘s policy on nuclear tests that was
published in 1965.35
If Chiu was inspired by Sohn, as his mentor at school, and even a
role model as a great international lawyer actively taking part in the
world affairs, Chiu may also have had some struggles with Sohn‘s
idea of international law. During this period, Sohn remained
ambiguous on China and in connection with it, Vietnam. On the one
hand, as an intellectual leader of the World Federalist movement,
Sohn was opposed to isolationist policy as a matter of principle and
advocated UN membership for all major countries.36 In World Peace
through World Law, Clark and Sohn reiterated that ―the plan would
not even become operative until active and permanent support had
been pledged by a great majority of all nations,‖ including the PRC
and the Soviet Union.37 On the other, however, the United World
Federalists did not confront President Lyndon B. Johnson on his
policy on the Vietnam War.38 In early 1966, a group called the
Lawyers Committee on American Policy toward Vietnam issued a
letter to President Johnson,39 challenging the legality of the war in

34. See generally CHIU, CAPACITY, supra note 12.
35. Hungdah Chiu, Communist China‟s Attitude towards Nuclear Tests, 21 CHINA Q. 96
(1965).
36. See generally Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International
Organization, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1964) (arguing against a policy of exclusion at the
United Nations by noting the failures of the League of Nations‘ exclusion policies). This was
in line with the United World Federalist (UWF), which has adopted a universalist approach
since 1954. See Ernest S. Lent, The Development of United World Federalist Thought and
Policy, 9 INT‘L ORG. 486, 492 (1955).
37. CLARK & SOHN, supra note 32, at xviii.
38. In March 1965, UWF wrote to President Johnson to offer its acquiescence to the
Vietnam War. UWF on Vietnam, FEDERALIST, Mar. 1965, at 6. Baratta noted that the world
federalist movement became divided long before the Vietnam War. It became clear in the
early 1950s, the Korean War: ―Everyone had to choose sides at a time of actual war in Korea
and threatened war in Europe. Even the peace movement divided. UWF was transformed
into a tame, respectable supporter of the UN as the U.S. employed it in the Cold War.‖
BARATTA, supra note 32, at 512.
39. An article in War/Peace Report noted in its March 1966 issue that ―[m]ost of the
debate over the Vietnam War has been on questions of morality and strategy, but in recent
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Vietnam.40 In response, on February 14, Sohn joined four law
academics—including Richard R. Baxter and Myres S. McDougal—
in writing a letter to the President,41 dismissing the challenges.
However, one month later, in March 1966, Sohn wrote a letter to
Senator J. William Fulbright,42 urging that the United States
recognize the government in Beijing. In an April issue of War/Peace
weeks the argument has sharpened over whether the U.S. position is legal under international
law.‖ Is U.S. Involvement in Vietnam Legal?, WAR/PEACE REPORT, Mar. 1966, at 16.
40. The legal and policy rationales of the Vietnam War were challenged by some of the
most respected international lawyers, including the late Quincy Wright, Richard Falk, and
Wolfgang G. Friedmann. Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J.
INT‘L L. 750, 754 (1966) (―Whatever motivations may have been influential, it is clear that
international law does not recognized ideological differences, and that by a state in the
internal affairs of another state, even on invitation of the government which it
recognizes…violates traditional international law and the United Nations Charter.‖); Richard
A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J.
1122 (1966); Richard Falk, International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A
Response to Professor Moore, 76 YALE L.J. 1095, 1095 (1967) (―I would contend that the
American military involvement resulted from a series of geo-political miscalculations, as
well as from a process of decision insensitive to world order considerations.‖); Wolfgang G.
Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM. J. INT‘L L. 857,
869 (1965) (―The Legal Adviser‘s argument is one of policy, not of law, and it seeks to
justify what is patently, by standards of international law, an illegal action, in terms of
ultimate policy objectives of the United States.‖); Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Intervention,
Civil War and the Role of International Law, 59 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 67, 74 (1965)
(―[I]n the absence of a functioning international peacekeeping and order machinery, it is
policy, not law, that determines the actions of stated with regard to intervention in civil wars
. . . .‖); Richard A. Falk, United States Foreign Policy and the Vietnam War: A Second
American Dilemma, 3 STAN. J. INT‘L STUD. 78, 78 (1968) (―[T]he United States, as a
consequence of the Vietnam War, is at a critical crossroads and, finally, that the world order
proposals outlined [competitive diplomacy and a framework for world order] can help
resolve the second American dilemma.‖). The anti-war outcry was widespread in Europe. In
West Germany, anti-war protests against the Vietnam War were often conflated, in the wake
of the Adolf Eichmann trials, with condemnation of the Nazi past. TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A
HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 419 (2005) (―Indeed, attacking ‗Amerika‘ (sic) for its
criminal war in Vietnam served almost as a surrogate for discussion of Germany‘s own war
crimes.‖). Wilfried Mausbach, Auschwitz and Vietnam: West German Protest against
America‟s War during the 1960s, in AMERICA, THE VIETNAM WAR, AND THE WORLD:
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 279 (Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C.
Gardner & Wilfried Mausbach eds., 2003). In Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, the American
Ambassador to Japan from 1961–1966, noted that escalation of the U.S. bombing of North
Vietnam early in 1965 produced a huge popular outcry of protest: ―The Japanese people,
who had seen their own cities wiped out by American bombers only twenty years ago, not
unnaturally identified themselves with the Vietnamese being bombed.‖ EDWIN O.
REISCHAUER, BEYOND VIETNAM: THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA 4 (1968).
41. William W. Bishop, et al., Letter to President Lyndon Johnson (Feb. 14, 1966),
112 CONG. REC. 3842 (Feb. 26, 1966).
42. Louis B. Sohn, Letter to Senator James W. Fulbright, (1966) reproduced in U.S.
POLICY WITH RESPECT TO MAINLAND CHINA: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE; EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION ON U.S.
POLICY WITH RESPECT TO MAINLAND CHINA, at 649–50 (1966).
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Report, an antiwar journal based in New York, Sohn proposed that all
the divided countries at the time—the two Chinas, the two Koreas,
the two Vietnams and the two Germanys—be admitted to the United
Nations; that the governments of East Germany, South Vietnam,
North Korea and Formosa (Taiwan) be admitted to the UN subject to
the condition of a five-year probation. During the probationary
period, the peoples of these divided countries would determine
whether to unite.43 Sohn even suggested that the Mao‘s China—along
with West Germany, India and Japan—be granted permanent
membership at the UN Security Council with a slightly diluted veto
power.44
For Sohn, treating the anti-communist Republic of China and
communist North Korea alike and giving Mao‘s China the privileged
position of permanent UN Security Council membership was a
practical solution to a tough problem in the real world. Chiu did not
comment on Sohn‘s proposals in his 1966 and 1968 articles. But his
silence explains his difficulty with Sohn‘s ideas of international law.
For Chiu—given his connection with the KMT in Taiwan—Sohn‘s
proposal must have seemed surprisingly instrumentalist, perhaps even
unprincipled. For a long while from the 1950s to the 1960s, both the
KMT in Taiwan and the communists in mainland China rejected
similar proposals.45 In a book published in 1967, Chen Lung-chu
noted, ―[w]hile the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists have
assailed one another in the most unqualified language, they have at
least one contention in common concerning Formosa. They declare in
unpremeditated concert that there is only ‗one China,‘ not ‗two
Chinas‘ or ‗one China, on Formosa.‘‖46 Thus it was impossible for
Chiu to take the proposal with ease because of Chiu‘s connection
with KMT. Chiu‘s difficulty goes further. Conceptually, underlying
43. Louis B. Sohn, China, the U.N. and the U.S., WAR/PEACE REPORT, Apr. 1966, at 10,
10–11. In 1966, the concept of ―two Chinas‖ became popular among the policy circles in the
United States. See generally UNA-USA NATIONAL POLICY PANEL, CHINA, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND UNITED STATES POLICY: A REPORT OF A NATIONAL POLICY PANEL (1966)
(concluding that Taiwan and China were two states under the UN Charter).
44. Sohn proposed a concurrent change of the voting rules of the Security Council,
which would retain the veto of the permanent members only with respect to binding
decisions of the Security Council and enabling the Security Council to make
recommendations by a vote concurred in by majority of the permanent members and a
majority of the non-permanent members. Sohn, supra note 43, at 11.
45. Akira Iriye, Dilemmas of American Policy towards Formosa, 15 CHINA Q. No. 51,
51 (1963) (―America‘s policy towards Formosa has come under fire in recent months from
all three groups of Chinese.‖).
46. LUNG-CHU CHEN & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, FORMOSA, CHINA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 87 (1967).
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Chiu‘s analysis of Communist China‘s ―attitude‖ toward international
law was the assumed distinction between law and politics. Given
Chiu‘s admiration for his mentor, his inspiration to be a competent
and sophisticated international lawyer, he had good reasons to believe
a more principled and legal solution could be found to address the
China issue. Sohn‘s proposal seemed a crude demonstration of
political maneuver—not by Communist China but by his own mentor
and role model.
Another international lawyer Chiu had difficulty with was Myres
McDougal, the Yale law professor who wrote the letter to President
Johnson together with Sohn in February 1966. On March 4, the State
Department prepared a legal memorandum titled ―The Legality of
United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam.‖47 In May, in
his capacity as President of the American Bar Association, McDougal
was invited to testify before the U.S. Senate on the lawfulness of the
Vietnam War,48 where he argued that it was justified under
international law. In the meantime, McDougal was strongly opposed
to China‘s membership in the United Nations. In a long article
published in October 1966 in the American Journal of International
Law, McDougal considered China‘s membership a threat to
international law: ―[a] transfer of China‘s United Nations seats could
affect the advancement of human rights, the development of
international law. . . .‖49
On its face, Chiu‘s 1966 article seemingly was in line with
McDougal‘s arguments. However, Chiu not only found McDougal
unconvincing, but also that the latter‘s instrumental view of law
resembled that of Communist China. In a footnote, Chiu noted that
―[a] few Western writers, however . . . advocate a theory on the role
of law which is essentially the same as that of Communist (Soviet or
Communist Chinese) writers.‖50 He referred to McDougal as the

47. The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 60 AM. J.
INT‘L L. 565 (1966).
48. John Norton Moore, James L. Underwood & Myres McDougal, ―The Lawfulness of
Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam‖ (May 1966), brief of the American Bar
Association, 112 CONG. REC. 14,943 (1966). A summarized version of this testimony was
published shortly after. John Norton Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the
Republic of Viet-Nam, 61 AM. J. INT‘L L. 1 (1967).
49. Myres McDougal & & Richard M. Goodman, Chinese Participation in the United
Nations: The Legal Imperatives of a Negotiated Solution, 60 AM. J. INT‘L L. 671, 672 (1966).
50. Chiu, International Law, supra note 8, at 249 n.10. On this, Chiu may have been
influenced by his collaborator Jerome A. Cohen. When recalling his student years at Yale
Law School, Cohen remarked:
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primary example of this view: ―[f]or instance, Professor McDougal
and his followers have consistently argued that law is an instrument
of policy.‖51 Chiu then quoted at length a critical summary of
McDougal‘s viewpoints from Richard Falk,52 an unsympathetic critic
of McDougal during the debates on the Vietnam War in the 1960s.
Chiu then proceeded to make his own comment, with an unfailing
sarcastic tone: ―[i]t is interesting to note that no writer in Communist
China has ever either cited McDougal‘s writings or commented on
his view.‖53 Chiu then raised the question of whether the United
Nations had the legitimate power and authority to decide the issue:
―Both the Republic of China and Communist China hold the view
that the United Nations is not competent to consider the ‗question of
Taiwan (Formosa).‘‖54
Chiu‘s explicitly critical comment on McDougal is a good
revelation of Chiu‘s struggles with the ideas of international law and
the politics behind them. In the process of working on his 1966 and
1968 articles Chiu experienced the tension between his ideal of
international law and the politics behind it. In both of the articles, his
meticulous survey of literature led him to clear conclusions that
Mao‘s China was playing politics with international law. But that
would not have been a surprise for any observer of Mao‘s China.
What he really has learned, hidden in between the lines, was the
political maneuver of international law, by people right around him,
on his side.

I had the good fortune to study with Professor Myres S. McDougal, who created
an innovative system for analyzing international legal problems. Yet, as others
have noted, the vice of the McDougal approach, at least as applied by the
Master and some of his disciples, is that in concrete cases it generally concludes
that my country, right or wrong, is right. ‗Reasonableness‘ in a nationalistic
cocoon reaches pre-ordained results.
Cohen, Ethnocentrism, supra note 26, at 192.
51. Chiu, International Law, supra note 8, at 249 n.10.
52. Richard A. Falk, Book Review, 8 NATURAL LAW FORUM 171 (1963) (reviewing
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL COERCION. Falk‘s critique of
McDougal was not hostile. On other occasions, Falk came to McDougal‘s defense when the
latter faced unfair critiques, e.g., Richard A. Falk, Editorial Comment, International Legal
Order: Alwyn V. Freeman vs. Myres S. McDougal, 59 AM. J. INT‘L L. 66, 66–71 (1965).
53. Chiu, International Law, supra note 8, at 249 n.16.
54. Chiu, United Nations, supra note 9, at 35–36 n.44. Chen Lung-chu also noted this:
―[Another] argument put forth by both governments is that the question of Formosa is a
domestic matter of China and outside the competence of the United Nations by Article 2(7)
of the U.N. Charter, to be settled exclusively between the Nationalist government and the
Communist government.‖ LUNG-CHU CHEN & LASSWELL, supra note 46, at 89.
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D. The Senate Hearings in 1966
Chiu‘s struggles must be understood in the broader context of
Asian studies in the United States during the acrimonious debates in
the era of the Vietnam War, in which a collective revolt against the
Johnson Administration was emerging in the 1966 and 1968 period.
This is most vividly reflected in the United States Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings in March 1966, where fourteen expert
witnesses were invited.55 Chaired by Senator J. William Fulbright,
the Committee was already seeing an emerging dove position of
dissent in the U.S. Senate who were openly critical of the Vietnam
War.56
The hearings covered a wide range of issues, including: China‘s
membership in the United Nations; China‘s relations with the Third
World; the U.S. trade embargo against China; Sino-Soviet relations;
and Taiwan‘s status. Even though they were asked to address
pressing questions such as explaining China‘s foreign policy and
predicting China‘s reaction to American policy in Vietnam,57 these
Asia specialists also took the opportunity to clarify the fundamental
misperceptions regarding China in the policy circles in Washington.
To a surprising degree, the testimonies of these experts totally
resonated with Chiu‘s struggles on two basic issues: first, what is
Communist China? Is it communist first or are Chinese first? Second,
what is on its agenda in terms of international order?

55. U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO MAINLAND CHINA: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE (89th Congress, Second Session, March
1966) [hereinafter, SENATE HEARINGS]. A collection of edited excerpts of these testimonies
was compiled by Professor Akira Iriye in U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA: TESTIMONY TAKEN
FROM THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARINGS, 1966 (Akira Iriye ed., 1968).
The fourteen expert witnesses included: A. Doak Barnett, John K. Fairbank, Benjamin I.
Schwartz, John M. H. Lindbeck, Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith II, Morton H. Halperin,
Alexander Eckstein, Donald S. Zagoria, Harold C. Hinton, Hon. Walter F. Judd, George E.
Taylor, David N. Rowe, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Robert A. Scalapino. See also The Great
China Debate Begins, 6 WAR/PEACE REPORT, Apr. 1966, at 3 (1966).
56. Senators Frank Church (D-Idaho), Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), and Ernest Gruening (DAlaska), represented the ―dove position‖ of dissent in the Senate. David F. Schmitz
& Natalie Fousekis, Frank Church, the Senate, and the Emergence of Dissent on the
Vietnam War, 63 PACIFIC HIST. REV. 561, 562 (1994). For discussions on political dissent in
the Vietnam debate in the U.S. Senate, see VIETNAM AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRADITION: THE POLITICS OF DISSENT (Randall Bennett Woods ed., 2003); and RANDALL B.
WOODS, J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, VIETNAM, AND THE SEARCH FOR A COLD WAR FOREIGN
POLICY (1998).
57. The expert witnesses did reach a policy consensus, ―containment without isolation,‖
a term coined by Barnett. SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 13.
ON
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In his testimony on day one, A. Doak Barnett, professor of
government at Columbia University, told Senator Fulbright: ―I think
that the history of the last hundred years has created in the minds of
all Chinese a feeling that China has been the pawn of colonial
imperial powers, and that China has to reassert its identity, reassert its
role in the world . . . .‖58 Barnett stressed that the resentment was not
based on communist ideology. He continued, ―I say all Chinese
because I think if you read some of Mao‘s books, but then also read
Chiang Kai-shek‘s book called ‗China‘s Destiny,‘ you will find that
in both of these books there is a deep resentment of the history of
colonialism against China in the nineteenth century.‖59
This was echoed by John Fairbank, who noted that in the 19th
century ―we Americans prided ourselves on championing China‘s
modernization and self-determination. We considered ourselves
above the nasty imperialism and power politics of the Europeans. We
developed a self-image of moral superiority.‖60 However, this was
only because of the U.S. ―open door‖ policy that enabled Americans
―to share all the special privileges of foreigners in China under the
unequal treaties without fighting for them.‖61 But this was not how
America was perceived: ―We have been part and parcel of the longterm Western approach to east [sic] Asia and ought to see ourselves
in that perspective . . . .‖62 He then turned to the contemporary
situation in Vietnam, observing ―striking‖ similarities to the colonial
wars of the past.63 Fairbank was most explicit: ―Stuck in a dirty war
today, we would do well to lower our self-esteem, be not so proud,
acknowledge our Western inheritance of both good and evil, and see
ourselves as hardly more noble and not much smarter than the British
and French in their day . . . .‖64 He also noted: ―Vietnam today gives
us a more severe crisis of moral conscience partly because during
most of our history we felt morally superior to the imperialist powers
of the 19th century.‖65 Fairbank subsequently summarized: ―Even if
Communism had never been invented, we would probably face today

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 17.
Id.
SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 103 (statement of John K. Fairbank).
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 105.
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a good deal of Chinese hostility. The origin of the PekingWashington impasse cannot be blamed wholly on Marx and Lenin.‖66
Benjamin Schwartz, a distinguished historian of China, reiterated
the indigenous elements in the rise of Mao and the Chinese
revolution: ―The development of [China‘s revolutionary] strategy on
the part of Mao and others was a gradual and groping process, there
was no preexistent blueprint. Neither Communist theory [nor]
Russian practice provided any clear ‗operational code.‘‖67 Schwartz
had noted that despite its Sino-centric notion of world order in its
long past, by the end of the Qing Dynasty, major intellectuals such as
Yan Fu and Liang Qichao had already been prepared to think of
China as one nation-state among others.68 The rise of Mao, Schwartz
argued, did not change this general position. Rather, Mao‘s embrace
of Marxism-Leninism was an endeavor to deal with a pressing
dilemma China was facing. On the one hand, having abandoned the
traditional views, China looked to the West for guidance; on the other
hand the teacher (the imperialist West) is constantly taking advantage
and attacking its pupils.69 During the 1960s, this fight for
―sovereignty‖ continued in Mao‘s efforts to escape from Soviet
control and efforts to establish China‘s own status in the communist
world.70 Schwartz pointed out in an essay published in April 1966:
―[a] candid survey of the span of Chinese history leads to no firm

66. John K. Fairbank, Why Peking Casts Us as the Villain, in CHINA: THE PEOPLE‘S
MIDDLE KINGDOM AND THE U.S.A. 103, 111 (1967).
67. SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 183 (statement of Benjamin Schwartz).
68. ―For at least a small but decisive segment of China‘s population, the bases of the
traditional conception of China‘s place in the world had decisively collapsed.‖ Benjamin
Schwartz, The Maoist Image of World Order, 21 J. INT‘L AFF. 92, 95 (1967). See generally
BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, IN SEARCH OF WEALTH AND POWER: YEN FU AND THE WEST (1964).
69. SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 98.
70. In response to Senator Hickenlooper‘s question at the hearings, Schwartz stated:
―One of the things that fascinates me about the Chinese press is that even when discussing
Vietnam they devote almost as much attention to their relations with the Soviet Union—to
their exasperation with the Soviet Union—as they do to their relations with us.‖ SENATE
HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 202. See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 100. After many
archives have been made available, we now have a lot more detailed information on the
rivalry and struggles between Mao‘s China and the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War
period. Eva-Maria Stolberg, People‟s Warfare versus Peaceful Coexistence? Vietnam and
the Sino-Soviet Struggle for Ideological Supremacy, in AMERICA, THE VIETNAM WAR, AND
THE WORLD: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 237 (Andreas W. Daum et al.
eds., 2003).
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conclusions on the question of whether the Chinese are more or less
belligerent or more or less fanatical than Westerners . . . .‖ 71
Though the public hearings failed to change the course of
American foreign policy immediately, they had a significant impact
on public opinion.72 Conceptually, the public hearings, like Chiu‘s
1966 and 1968 articles on China‘s attitudes toward international law,
challenged the notion that China as a communist regime had any
intrinsic position on international law. Rather, Chiu‘s use of the word
―attitude‖—understood by its context—implicitly calls for an
interactional approach in the understanding of the position. After all,
attitude, as the state of mind, is partially the product of interactive
processes.73
II. AN INTERACTIONAL APPROACH
When ―attitude‖ is used to indicate an intrinsic position
predetermined by identity, the use of identity perpetuates circular
claims. What Chiu, Cohen, Edwards, Schwartz, and Fairbank did
together in 1966–1968 was a surprisingly postmodernist
deconstruction of the identity label ―Communist China.‖ Instead, they
all pointed to an interactive approach as an alternative explanation:
that China‘s ―attitude‖ was better understood as a response to its prior
experiences, particularly its humiliation by the Western powers in the
nineteenth century.74 These insights, though contested by historians
for their limits,75 can serve as a point of departure for us to build a

71. BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ, Chinese Visions and American Policies, reprinted in
COMMUNISM AND CHINA: IDEOLOGY IN FLUX 186 (1968).
72. FOOT, supra note 6, at 100–02.
73. As George H. Mead pointed out:
We must regard mind, then, as arising and developing within the social process,
within the empirical matrix of social interactions. We must, that is, get an inner
individual experience from the standpoint of social acts which include the
experience of separate individuals in a social context wherein those individuals
interact. The processes of experience which the human brain makes possible are
made possible only for a group of interacting individuals: only for individual
organisms which are members of a society; not for the individual organism in
isolation from other individual organisms.
GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST
133 (1934).
74. This was particularly embodied in a documentary history of China. See generally
CHINA‘S RESPONSE TO THE WEST: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, 1839-1923 (Ssu-yü Teng &
John K. Fairbank eds., 1954).
75. For critiques of the ―response‖ theses, see PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN
CHINA: AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITING ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 9–56 (1984). Paul A.
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bridge toward a more general theory—an interactional approach in
international law articulated by lawyers in the late 1960s and early
1970s.
At the time of the Vietnam War debates, an interactional
approach in sociology was initially developed by Herbert Blumer,
who coined the term ―symbolic interactionism.‖76 In legal theory, this
approach was further developed by the late Lon L. Fuller.77
According to Fuller, in a typical legal relationship—between two
parties to a contract, or between litigants and the judge in a trial, or
between lawgiver and subject in a kingdom—―the central purpose of
law is to furnish base lines for human interaction.‖78 It is ―human
interactions [that] give substance and shape to the law.‖79 Fuller
warned: ―the existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of
expectations between lawgiver and subject is part of the very idea of
a functioning legal order.‖80 Also, ―[w]hen this bond of reciprocity is
finally and completely ruptured by government, nothing is left on
which to ground the citizen‘s duty to observe the rules.‖81 In rejecting
Cohen contended that American historians on China remained West-centric in the
―response‖ literature:
My argument is not that the West‘s actual historical role was unimportant but
rather that it has been blown out of proportion in comparison with other factors
and misstated, and that both the overstatement and misstatement have been a
consequence largely of the conceptual paradigms with which Americans have
approached China.
Id. at 5.
76. HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD (1969).
See also JEROME S. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990).
77. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW
(Robert P. Wolff ed., 1971) [hereinafter Fuller, Human Interaction]; Lon L. Fuller, Some
Unexplored Social Dimensions of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967, at 59
(Arthur E. Sutherland ed., 1968) (arguing that human interactions give substance and shape
to the law) [hereinafter Fuller, Unexplored Social Dimensions]; LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (revised ed. 1969) [hereinafter FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW]; LON L.
FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968). A good collection of Fuller‘s works is THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I. Winston ed.,
2001).
78. Fuller, Human Interaction, supra note 77, at 201. This was best demonstrated in
Fuller‘s contract theory, Lon L. Fuller & Willam R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 809 (1941) (―In all these cases there may be an element of exchange in
the background, just as the whole of society is permeated by a principle of reciprocity.‖).
79. Fuller, Unexplored Social Dimensions, supra note 77, at 59.
80. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 77, at 209. ―It [the new analytical
jurisprudence] does not discern as an essential element in the creation of a legal system any
tacit cooperation between lawgiver and citizen; the law is seen as simply acting on the
citizen—morally or immorally, justly or unjustly, as the case may be.‖ Id. at 192.
81. Id. at 40.
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legal positivist tradition in identifying law with coercive power,
Fuller used an analogy:
If a gunman says, ―Your money or your life,‖ it is certainly
expected that if I give him my money, he will spare my life.
If he accepts my purse and then shoots me down, I should
suppose his conduct would not only be condemned by
moralists, but also by right-thinking highwaymen. In this
sense, not even an ―unconditional surrender‖ is really
unconditional . . . .82
Fuller‘s insight has recently been applied to international law by
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope who have developed an
interactional theory of international law.83 They regard the
conception of reciprocity as ―the very heart‖ of their theory. 84 For
Brunnée and Toope, an interactional theory based on Fuller‘s idea of
reciprocity departs from the traditional view of international law that
is focused on the structure of legal treaties or the framework of
international organizations. From the vantage point of interactional
theory: (a) international law becomes horizontal rather than
hierarchical because every member has an equal obligation to follow
the rules and fulfill its promises; (b) reciprocity means that
fulfillment of obligations becomes the center; and (c) fulfillment of
obligations does not necessarily mean a uniform enforcement
imposed from above, but rather it allows a diversity of ways for the
fulfillment. They explain: ―Like Fuller, we accept that power and
force are salient to law, but they do not explain the sense of
obligation that must exist in international society for legal
enforcement to be possible and effective.‖85 Reciprocity also means
that legal norms are not tested by the structure, but also by their
fulfillment. Thus, ―Fidelity to law depends on the reciprocal

82. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 77, at 139.
83. JUTTA BURNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010) [hereinafter BURNNÉE & TOOPE, LEGITIMACY];
Jutta Burnnée & Stephen J. Toope, Interactional International Law: An Introduction, 3 INT‘L
THEORY 307 (2011); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and
Constructivism: Elements of an International Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT‘L L. 19 (2000). On Fuller‘s contribution to interactional theory of international
law, see BURNNÉE & TOOPE, LEGITIMACY, supra, at 20–33.
84. BURNNÉE & TOOPE, LEGITIMACY, supra note 83, at 7.
85. Id. at 34.
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fulfillment of duties.‖86 Failure in fulfillment, or ―claims of legal
‗exceptionalism‘ by powerful states can be corrosive.‖87
Interactional theory of international law was by international
lawyers from America‘s closest ally—Canada (Brunnée was a
professor at University of Toronto and Toope President and ViceChancellor of the University of British Columbia). The book begins
with a scene of London, Berlin, Melbourne, Madrid, New York, and
other cities around the world in 2003: ―millions of people around the
world marched in the streets of their towns and cities to protest the
impending invasion of Iraq by a ‗coalition of the willing‘ led by the
government of the United States of America.‖88 Similar to Fuller‘s
analogy of the gunman and his victim story, Brunnée and Toope
argue that if the realpolitik pundits were right that the world is a
jungle, then ―there is law in the jungle . . . and the law of jungle is not
made only by the strongest: nor is it broken with impunity.‖89
Interactional theory of international law provides a valuable
perspective that can contribute to the current debates on international
law. In many aspects, this perspective adds to the critique of the
realist tradition that started with Henry Kissinger. First, interactional
theory echoes the fundamental value that might does not equal
right.90 It challenges the self-rightness, often shared by both
conservatives and the liberals in the United States. For example,
despite all that has happened in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and other
scandals, the talk of ―acculturation‖ still insists that other states must
embrace human rights,91 as if these other states have nothing to say
about human rights in the Bush Administration. Thus, even though
this ―acculturation‖ concedes some element of interaction, it is
largely based on an implicit notion of interaction characterized as
one-way traffic. Second, interactional theory of international law may
86. Id. at 38.
87. Id. at 40.
88. Id. at 1.
89. BURNNÉE & TOOPE, LEGITIMACY, supra note 83, at 5.
90. Peter G. Danchin, Beyond Rationalism and Instrumentalism: The Case for
Rethinking U.S. Engagement with International Law and Organization, 28 SAIS REV. 79
(2008).
91. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Ryan Goodman, International
Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 DUKE
L.J. 983 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003). For critiques of Goodman and Jinks‘ theory, see
Jose E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize, 54 DUKE L.J. 961 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh,
Internalization through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975 (2005).
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also contribute to the critique of realism by arguing that the
realpolitik mentality is not realistic enough to take into account the
legitimacy costs. For example, Brunnée and Toope offer detailed
analysis of how other countries reacted to the Bush Administration‘s
positions on climate change, torture, and the use of force.92
The remainder of this article aims to follow the realist critique of
realpolitik approach by discussing how China reacted to the Bush
Doctrine by making major strategic shifts in the area of international
law on human rights. The key component of such a shift was that
China started incorporating, in rhetoric and legislation, norms of
international human rights law. This strategic shift cannot be
explained by the nature of China‘s political regime, nor by the socalled ―Asian values.‖93 It is rather motivated by China‘s response to
the War on Iraq. This motivation determines, strategically, the
substance of the shift, which was to embrace international norms, and
exploit the failures of the Bush Doctrine for China‘s own political
gain. As a consequence, what is unforeseen by the traditional theory
in the wake of the Iraq War is a completely new form of international
politics in the multipolar world.
III. CHINA‘S ATTITUDES TO HUMAN RIGHTS
There are three strategic shifts. During stage one, between 1989
and 2001, China was under international pressure to maintain human
rights dialogue. For China, the main task during this period was to
reintegrate into the international community. In stage two, after
September 11, 2001 but before news broke of torture at Guantánamo
and Abu Ghraib in 2004, China and the United States collaborated on
their own ―wars on terror.‖ In stage three, after mid-2004, the Bush
Administration and China split over torture scandals each accusing

92. BURNNÉE & TOOPE, LEGITIMACY, supra note 83, chs. 4–6.
93. One popular use of the ―Asian value‖ theory to explain China‘s ideological ―threat‖
was manifested in Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7
CHICAGO J. INT‘L L. 1, 3 (2006). Posner and Yoo predicted, specifically:
Right now China does not seem concerned about ideological conflict with the
West. But if it becomes an issue, then China will most likely advance a version
of the Asian values argument of a few years back, according to which Asians
(or certain Asians) prefer a society in which order trumps human rights. . . .
There is not yet any philosophy that extols capitalism and rejects democracy,
but perhaps one will be supplied when China needs an ideology that will
mobilize international support among the enemies of the U.S.
Id. at 11–12.
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each other of human rights violations. Subsequently, China‘s rhetoric
and legislative efforts on human rights intensified.
A.

Return to the International Community

China‘s rise at the turn of the century is inescapably under the
shadow of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre.94 Facing widespread
condemnation from the rest of the world, China‘s official position on
international law has been defensive. It sought refuge in a notion of
―sovereignty,‖ however unconvincing for international lawyers.95
Martial law was imposed until January 1990, armed People‘s
Liberation Army soldiers were visible in Beijing‘s streets, and
political dissenters were jailed. China looked no different from Chile
in 1973 under General Augusto Pinochet. In the aftermath of 1989,
despite China‘s insistence on ―sovereignty‖ and its ―Chinese
characteristics,‖ it did not totally cut itself off from international
human rights norms. In November 1991, China published its first
White Paper on Human Rights96 when Beijing was under the most
pressure from the West. The White Paper addressed people‘s
subsistence rights, political rights, economic, cultural, and social
rights, human rights in judicial process, labor rights, religious
freedom, ethnic minorities‘ rights, human rights in family planning,
people with disability, and China‘s participation in international
human rights events. No doubt, the White Paper denied the existence
of political prisoners. There was also an effort to reclaim legitimacy
by reminding the people of China‘s colonial past. Not only did it
endorse the idea that human rights could be a legitimate agenda item

94. EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA 616–39
(2011). See generally ZHAO ZIYANG, PRISONER OF THE STATE: THE SECRET JOURNAL OF
PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG (Bao Pu, Renee Chiang & Adi Ignatius trans., 2009); TIMOTHY
BROOK, QUELLING THE PEOPLE: THE MILITARY SUPPRESSION OF THE BEIJING DEMOCRACY
MOVEMENT (1992); BEIJING SPRING, 1989, CONFRONTATION AND CONFLICT: THE BASIC
DOCUMENTS (Michel Oksenberg et al. eds., 1990). On the impacts of Tiananmen on China,
see DINGXIN ZHAO, THE POWER OF TIANANMEN: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND THE 1989
BEIJING STUDENT MOVEMENT (2001).
95. Thus it was very courageous for Wang Tieya to state at The Hague during his
lectures at the Academy in 1990, shortly after Tiananmen, that ―[d]oubts have sometimes
been cast upon the possible acceptance of international law by developing countries . . . [t]he
main attitude of the developing countries, as illustrated by that of the PRC, is rather to adopt
the international law as a whole, to apply its principles and rules and promotes its
development.‖ Wang Tieya, supra note 5, at 355.
96. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (1991),
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm.
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in diplomacy;97 it even endorsed the basic contents of human rights—
though it tried to twist them by focusing on economic rights.
During the 1990s, China launched a series of domestic law
reforms and signed a number of international human rights treaties.
China substantially reformulated its Criminal Procedural Code in
1996 and the Criminal Code in March 1997, where efforts were taken
to incorporate some human rights rules.98 In October 1997, China
signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in October 1998. As Andrew Nathan
concluded, by the end of the 1990s, China had by and large accepted
human rights as a normal part of its diplomacy agenda:99
Beijing‘s response to international human rights pressures
demonstrated realism, central coordination, strategic
consistency, and tactical flexibility. China‘s policy
combined resistance and selective concessions, in a mixture
designed simultaneously to rally Third World support,
especially in multilateral settings, to appeal to advocates of
realpolitik in the West, and to construct policy dilemmas
for human rights advocates.100

97. James D. Seymour, a human rights observer on China, noted in the early 1990s that
―publication of the white paper [of 1991] amounted to an implicit acknowledgement that
human rights (however defined) are a legitimate international concern.‖ James D. Seymour,
Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations, in CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN
RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 211 (Samuel S. Kim ed., 3d ed. 1994). In the
meantime, however, China also intensified its efforts to block international efforts on human
rights. See generally Samuel S. Kim, Human Rights in China‟s International Relations, in
WHAT IF CHINA DOESN‘T DEMOCRATIZE? IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR AND PEACE (Edward
Friedman & Barrett L. McCormick, eds. 2000).
98. On the revision of the Criminal Procedure Code and Criminal Code, see H. L. Fu,
Criminal Defense in China: The Possible Impact of the 1996 Criminal Procedural Law
Reform, 153 CHINA Q. 31 (1998); Ding Jian Cai, China‟s Major Reform in Criminal Law, 11
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 213 (1997); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO
REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA‘S REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL LAW (1996); Donald C.
Clarke & James V. Feinerman, Antagonistic Contradictions: Criminal Law and Human
Rights in China, 141 CHINA Q. 135 (1995).
99. Andrew J. Nathan, China and the International Human Rights Regime, in CHINA
JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 136, 160 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel
Oksenberg eds., 1999). For similar views, see Peter Van Ness, Addressing the Human Rights
Issue in Sino-American Relations, 49 J. INT‘L AFF. 309 (1996); DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS:
CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA (Peter Van Ness ed., 1999); Samuel S.
Kim, China and the United Nations, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
42 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg, eds. 1999).
100. Nathan, supra note 99, at 148. See also ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE (1999). In broader areas:
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There was a practical reason for this basic strategy: Western
human rights discourse with China had one piece of powerful
leverage—international trade. China had started the process of
―resuming‖ its status as a founding member of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in July 1986.101 By the
middle of 1989, China‘s accession to GATT had been widely
anticipated.102 The Tiananmen incident in June, however, disrupted
the process: a GATT working party session, scheduled for July 1989,
was first put off to September, and then further delays ensued. 103 It
would take ten years—until 1999, when a final deal was reached
between the United States and China—that accession was in sight
again. For fifteen years, a federal statute in the United States, known
as the Jackson-Vanik Act, required that every year the President
submit to Congress a report indicating that no human rights violations
had occurred in China in order for China to have access to the U.S.
market.104 This annual review of human rights conditions in China
did not end until 2001, when the Act was amended after U.S.-China
deal on accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).105 Human
rights discourse also changed the nature and substance of the

the nagging question of whether China accepts the basic legitimacy of the
current rules of international organizations and norms and whether it will seek
to drastically alter them once admitted. Thus far, the answer seems to be that
China‘s mere act of seeking admission to current global institutions represents a
willingness to acknowledge their legitimacy, generally play by the rules, and
seek to be a member of the ‗club.‘ As long as China has basically constructive
relations with the other big powers, we can expect that this will remain the
case.‖
David M. Lampton, A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global Order,
in LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S./CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 120, 131–32
(Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997).
101. Julia Ya Qin, China and the GATT: Accession Instead of Resumption, 27 J. WORLD
TRADE 77 (1993); Guiguo Wang, China‟s Return to GATT, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 51 (1994).
102. According to Harold Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg:
[u]ntil the summer of 1989, many participants believed that at some point a
decision would be made to sign a protocol even if all the issues were not
completely resolved, and they believed that this would occur before or
simultaneously with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. ―The fact that the
U.S. legislation giving the President negotiating authority would expire at the
end of 1990 established a practical deadline for the Uruguay Round.‖
HAROLD JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA‘S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE WORLD
BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 103 (1990).
103. Id. at 102.
104. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a)–(e) (2006).
105. Normal Trade Relations for the People‘s Republic of China, Pub. L. 106-286, 114
Stat. 880 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). See also Proclamation No. 7516, 67
Fed. Reg. 479 (Dec. 27, 2011).
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accession negotiations: more demanding commercial concessions
were added,106 backed up by a threat of trade embargo.
On the other hand, China did not merely stay defensive on
human rights. Shortly after it signed the ICESCR in 1997 and the
ICCPR in 1998, China started responding to the annual human rights
reports by the U.S. State Department. First, the China Society for
Human Rights Studies—a semi-official institution—issued a report
titled Human Rights in Name, Swaying Power in Reality.107 In
addition to pointing out factual errors, the report explicitly challenged
the U.S. position that human rights were universal norms.108 In
February the following year, again in response to the U.S. State
Department‘s human rights report, the State Council‘s Information
Office (SCIO) released a report U.S. Human Rights Record in
1999.109 Largely based on Western media reports, the white paper
addressed four categories covered by human rights conventions: civil
and political rights; social and economic rights; racial discrimination;
and violation of the rights of women and children. In subsequent
years, SCIO would continue its rhetoric on human rights, thus
making its annual report an institutionalized channel of
―communication‖ between the United States and China.
B.

Response to the Bush Doctrine

After the September 11th tragedy, China‘s response to the Bush
Doctrine, as noted by Peter Van Ness, came in three stages:
avoidance, collaboration, and strategic response.110 China quickly
found common ground with the Bush Administration: combating

106. ―WTO-Plus‖ obligations have been hotly debated. See, e.g., Julia Ya Qin, “WTOPlus” Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An Appraisal of the
China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003) (noting that China‘s Accession
Protocol contains a large number of special provisions that have significantly revised WTO
rules of conduct when applied to China trade).
107. China Issues Commentary on US Human Rights Report, BEIJING REV. Mar. 23–29,
1998, at 11.
108. Id. at 14 (―In fact, it is the United States which takes itself as an ‗exception to the
principle of universality‘ of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.‖).
109. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IN 1999
(2000), available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ppflg/t36620.htm.
110. Peter Van Ness, Bush‟s Search for Absolute Security and the Rise of China, in BUSH
AND ASIA: AMERICA‘S EVOLVING RELATIONS WITH EAST ASIA 97 (Mark Beeson ed., 2006);
Peter Van Ness, China‟s Response to the Bush Doctrine, 21 WORLD POL‘Y J. 38 (2005);
CONFRONTING THE BUSH DOCTRINE: CRITICAL VIEWS FROM THE ASIA-PACIFIC (Peter Van
Ness & Mel Gurtov eds., 2005).
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terrorism.111 Between 2001 and 2002, China supported President
Bush on a series of UN Security Council votes.112 In return,
on August 26, 2002, the U.S. State Department designated the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist group
associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, or the Taliban allowing
its assets to be frozen under Executive Order 13224.113 The ETIM‘s
members consist mainly of Uighurs—Muslim Chinese citizens from
Xinjiang province. Soon after, with Bush Administration support, UN
Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1390 gave ETIM a similar
designation.114 Initially, some officials in the Bush Administration
were suspicious and raised questions regarding the human rights of
the Uighurs during meetings with Chinese officials,115 but
cooperation from China seemed more important. Both sides wanted
to internationalize their ―war on terror‖: the United States wanted
China‘s support, and China took the opportunity to demand
recognition of the legitimacy of its domestic program.
111. On September 12, 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, in a telephone conversation
with President Bush, promised to cooperate with the United States to combat terrorism. On
September 20, China offered ―unconditional support‖ to the United States in fighting
terrorism. See SHIRLEY A. KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33001, U.S.-CHINA
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 1 (2010). At a hearing before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell said: ―President
Jiang Zemin was one of the first world leaders to call President Bush and offer his sorrow
and condolences for the tragic events of September 11. And in the almost 5 months since
that date, China has helped in the war against terrorism.‖ FOREIGN POLICY OVERVIEW AND
THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET REQUEST 27 (S. Hrg. 107299), Feb. 5, 2002.
112. S.C. Res 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) condemning the 9/11
terrorist attacks); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 29, 2001) (affirming global
efforts to combat terrorism); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001)
(condemning the Taliban); S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002) (freezing
funds and assets of Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization, and the
Taliban). For a discussion of the link between the above-cited U.N. Security Council
resolutions and China‘s domestic ―anti-terror‖ policy see Michael Clarke, Widening the Net:
China‟s Anti-Terror Laws and Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
14 INT‘L J. HUM. RTS. 542 (2010).
113. Executive Order 13224 permits the President of the United States to designate and
block property of persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
114. Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement: Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing,
SEC. COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 1267 (1999) AND 1989 (2011)
CONCERNING AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES, available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE08802E.shtml.
115. Francis Taylor, State Department‘s Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, visited
Beijing in December 2001, and Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, visited Beijing
in August 2002. Both raised questions of the human rights of the Uighurs, KAN, supra note
111, at 5-6. In April 1999, Amnesty International issued a report on human rights violations
in Xinjiang. AMNESTY INT‘L, PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION (1999).
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In the 2000s, China‘s diplomacy gradually loosened its rigid
adherence to the notion of sovereignty.116 It has been increasingly
involved in UN peacekeeping operations since the 1990s,117 even
supporting UN humanitarian intervention in East Timor. On
Xinjiang, China had started working with Central Asia republics and
Russia, and had formed a regional framework called the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001, shortly before
September 11. SCO included a component on terrorism.118 After the
9/11 tragedy, China moved quickly to be part of the global
framework on terrorism. On November 13, 2001, the day when
President Bush signed a military order allowing U.S. military
detention of non-citizens pursuant to the war on terror,119 China
signed two international treaties on terrorism: the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism.120
For a while, the United States and China‘s cooperation went
largely unnoticed. China amended its Criminal Code on December
29, 2001 to strengthen penalties on crimes related to terrorism.121 In
March 2002, Amnesty International raised human rights concerns
regarding China‘s post-9/11 crackdown on Xinjiang ―separatists.‖122
116. Allen Carlson, More Than Just Saying No: China‟s Evolving Approach to
Sovereignty and Intervention, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
217 (Alistair Iain Johnston & Robert Ross eds., 2006) [hereinafter Carlson, More Than Just
Saying No]; Allen Carlson, Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent
Changes in China‟s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia
Concept, 20 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 89 (2011).
117. Stefan Stähle, China‟s Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, 195 CHINA Q. 631 (2008); Carlson, More Than Just Saying No, supra note 116,
at 221–24.
118. Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, June 15,
2001, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f5d9f92.html. This convention was signed by
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People‘s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the
Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Michael
Clarke, China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue, 22 GLOBAL
CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 215, 215 (2010).
119. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
120. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000).
121. Amendment III to the Criminal Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated
by the People‘s Nat‘l Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Dec. 29, 2001),
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_75958.htm.
122. AMNESTY INT‘L, PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: CHINA‘S ANTI-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION AND REPRESSION IN THE XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION (2002).
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In 2002, U.S. forces captured 22 Uighurs during ―Operation Enduring
Freedom‖ in Afghanistan, and then incarcerated them at Guantánamo
Bay. This did not become an issue in U.S.-China relations until 2004
when, in its annual report, the State Department noted: ―The
[Chinese] Government used the international war on terror as a
pretext for cracking down harshly on suspected Uighur separatists
expressing peaceful political dissent and on independent Muslim
religious leaders.‖123 In May 2004, Amnesty International reported
that the Bush Administration had permitted Chinese officials to visit
Guantánamo Bay in 2002 and participate in interrogations in which
Uighur detainees with Chinese citizenship were subjected to sleep
deprivation, forced sitting for many hours, and intimidation.124 This
disclosure exacerbated the already embarrassing scandals of torture in
Abu Ghraib, which first broke on CBS‘s 60 Minutes on April 28, then
a few days later in the New Yorker magazine.125 In August, Secretary
of State Colin Powell assured the general public that the Uighurs
would not be going back to China, and that ―we are trying to find
places for them.‖126
Legally, where to put the detainees when they were released
became a significant question after the Supreme Court decided on
June 28, 2004 that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear detainees‘
habeas corpus petitions.127 Abu Bakker Qassim and A‘del Abdu AlHakim, two Uighurs originally from Xinjiang province petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus on March 10, 2005.128 The government
conceded that the petitioners were ―no longer enemy
combatants,‖ and the parties agreed that the petitioners should be
released. The court struggled on the issue of whether they could be
released into the United States.129 However, ―[i]t is undisputed that
123. U.S. DEP‘T STATE, 2003 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CHINA
(Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27768.htm.
124. Group Says Chinese Saw Detainees, WASH. POST, May 26, 2004, at A16; KAN,
supra note 111, at 14.
125. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB
(2004) (collecting a number of Hersh‘s New Yorker pieces).
126. KAN, supra note 111, at 14.
127. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
128. Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2005).
129. Judge Robertson noted that:
As a practical matter, however, it is a safe prediction that any order requiring
the immediate release of these petitioners would be appealed, that the Court of
Appeals would enter a stay, as it did in Guantánamo Detainee Cases, and that
whatever processes are now underway for alleviating the conditions of
petitioners' detention and arranging for their relocation to another country
would be put on hold pending the appeal.
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the government cannot return these petitioners to China, because they
would be persecuted there.‖130 On May 5, 2006, the two petitioners
(together with the other three Ughiurs) were released to Albania,
despite China‘s demand for their return.
This would become a recurring theme. Subsequently Huzaifa
Parhat, another Uighur detainee, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in July 2005, then again in December 2006.131 The Federal
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit later ordered his release.132 In
Kiyemba v. Obama, seventeen Uighur detainees brought petitions for
writs of habeas corpus; while the court ultimately ordered their
release, it was similarly reluctant to release the detainees to China
because of their fears of mistreatment.133 China, of course, fiercely
protested any non-China transfer.134
C. China‟s Critique of United States on Torture
The U.S.-China dispute over Uighur detainees set the framework
for human rights discourse between the two countries. Despite all the
rhetoric about torture and irrelevance of international law—backed
by the secret torture memos—the Bush Administration was
embarrassed by Amnesty International‘s disclosure that they had
allowed Chinese intelligence and military officials to interrogate and
torture the Uighurs in Guantánamo.

Qassim, 382 F.Supp. 2d at 128–29. On rehearing, the court stated further indicated its
reluctance to order the Uighurs‘ release into the United States: ―An order requiring their
release into the United States—even into some kind of parole ‗bubble,‘ some legal-fictional
status in which they would be here but would not have been ‗admitted‘—would have
national security and diplomatic implications beyond the competence or the authority of this
Court.‖ Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 193, 203 (D.D.C 2005).
130. Qassim 382 F.Supp.2d at 128.
131. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
132. Id. at 854.
133. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The United States Supreme
Court, after learning that each of the remaining petitioners had received and rejected at least
two offers of resettlement, vacated the Court of Appeals‘ decision and remanded the case to
the lower courts to ―determine, in the first instance, what further proceedings in that court or
in the District Court are necessary and appropriate for the full and prompt disposition of the
case in light of the new developments.‖ Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 1235, (2010) (per
curiam). The Court of Appeals found that no further proceedings were necessary and
reinstated its prior opinion as modified, 605 F.3d 1046 (C.A.D.C.2010) (per curiam), cert.
denied, Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S.Ct. 1631 (2011).
134. Throughout the period, China‘s Foreign Ministry spokesmen, Qin Gang and Ma
Zhaoxu, repeatedly demand that the United States extradite the Uighurs back to China:
China Demands US Return Uighurs, BBC News, Jun. 11, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8094658.stm.
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China probably thought of itself as the ―right-thinking
highwayman‖ who just witnessed a terrible crime; but now the
gunman is pointing to the highwayman by saying: he has blood on his
hands! If the Chinese officials were there in Guantánamo in 2002,
they probably had firsthand observation of torture in practice. Thus
they may well have good reasons to be outraged when they were
singled out as the main focus of the torture scandals. Their repeated
protests over the failure of the United States to return the Uighur
detainees to China was probably based not only on their ―traditional‖
notion of sovereignty, but on their discontent with the Bush
Administration‘s human rights double standard. Therefore, the
disputes over the Uighur detainees created an inescapable and urgent
need to talk back, by resorting to human rights norms in the existing
framework of international law.
At the UN Security Council, China joined Russia and France in
opposing the war on Iraq, with frequent reference to international
law.135 After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, China began to ratchet up the
rhetoric on human rights.136 Notably, the 2008 report picked the
United States as an ―anti-system‖ party:
The United States is inactive towards its international
human rights obligations under the international treaties.
The U.S. signed the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 31 years ago, the Covenant on
the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against
Women 28 years ago, and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child 14 years ago, but none of the above treaties has
been approved yet.137
This is accompanied by the incorporation of human rights into
the official reference framework. In March 2004, China‘s legislature
passed a Constitutional Amendment, adding a paragraph to Article
33: ―The State respects and preserves human rights.‖ A similarly
vague but nevertheless significant sentence was added to the new

135. Tang Jiaxuang, China‘s Foreign Minister between 1998 and 2008, wrote a personal
account of diplomacy during this period of time. TANG JIAXUANG, HEAVY STORM AND
GENTLE BREEZE: A MEMOIR OF CHINA‘S DIPLOMACY (2011),
136. E.g., STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD OF THE US IN
2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/09/eng20060309_249259.html (addressing
controversial wiretapping under the U.S. PATRIOT Act, Guantánamo, and the killing of
civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan).
137. STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IN THE UNITED
STATES IN 2008, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200902/26/content_10904741.htm.
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CPC Charter in October 2007. In April 2009, SCIO issued the
―National Human Rights Action Plan,‖ setting out an all-around plan
for human rights development in China in the next two years.138
D. The Logic of “Soft Power” Discourse
This intense engagement with the United States over human
rights was not merely an effort to justify China‘s demand of the
Uighurs. It is part of a much broader and ambitious project—China‘s
―soft power.‖
Coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr., soft power refer to the phenomenon
in which a country‘s culture, ideology, and institutions are so
attractive that it has the ability to co-opt other countries to develop
preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with one‘s
own nation.139 In the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Nye had
meant to advocate a liberal view of power politics for the United
States by deemphasizing military competition and emphasizing more
institutional building as the Cold War came to the end. But the
concept was soon picked up in China by Wang Huning—a professor
at Fudan University who was on his way to Beijing to become a
senior advisor to Jiang Zemin.140 Wang was suspicious that Nye‘s
argument was thinly-veiled American imperialism; nevertheless, he
recognized that the notion was useful because it could be used to
strengthen China‘s own identity.
China‘s first taste of its ―soft power‖ was the 1997–1998 Asian
Financial Crises, when Premier Zhu Rongji‘s decision not to devalue
the Renmimbi received international praise. China was looked upon
as a ―responsible power‖ in international affairs. In subsequent years,
China quickly returned to the international community: in July 2001,
China was awarded the opportunity to host the 2008 Summer
Olympic Games, and in December of the same year, China joined the
WTO. In 2004, a paper by a Goldman Sachs executive, titled ―The

138. State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China
(2009-2010), CHINA DAILY, Apr. 14, 2009, at 7.
139. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS
(2004); JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER
(1990). Young Nam Cho & Jong Ho Jeong, China‟s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources,
and Prospects, 48 ASIAN SURVEY 453 (2008); David M. Lampton, China‟s Rise in Asia Need
Not Be at America‟s Expense, in POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA‘S NEW DYNAMICS 306
(David Shambaugh ed., 2006).
140. JOSEPH FEWSMITH, CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN: FROM DENG XIAOPING TO HU JINTAO
151 (2008) (discussing China‘s response to Huntington).
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Beijing Consensus‖ became popular in China,141 firing up a growing
obsession and fantasy with the ―China model‖ or ―China path.‖
During the 2008 global financial crisis, there was a popular saying in
China, ―Only China can save capitalism,‖ a paraphrase of a popular
slogan in Mao‘s era, ―Only socialism can save China.‖142 China as a
―responsible power‖ appeared frequently in official media. For
instance, when covering China‘s efforts on global financial stability,
a People‟s Daily report on March 30, 2009 was titled ―Showcasing
the Image of a Responsible Power.‖143
In the midst of this growing confidence and assertiveness, the
―soft power‖ campaign also included a Chinese edition of the
―cultural war‖ targeting Western hegemony in sociopolitical
discourse—or huayu quan [话语权]. In 2009, the People‟s Forum,144
argued that the secrets of Western hegemony in discourse lay in its
conceptual frameworks that are laden with Western values. Now that
the global financial crisis has proved that the ―Washington
Consensus‖ is broken, it is time for Chinese scholars to come up with
their own theories, with Chinese characteristics. The incorporation of
human rights into the Constitution, even the aforementioned Party‘s
Charter, was only the first step. The expected next step was the
conceptual ―innovation‖ in human rights as well. Wang Chen, head
of SCIO, encouraged ―innovation‖ in human rights theory in a speech
at a 2011 national conference on human rights.145 He noted that as
China‘s national power grows, Chinese values and development path
continue to gain attention, thereby increasing China‘s importance in
international affairs. The goal for the Chinese human rights theorists,
Wang announced, was to

141. JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE FOREIGN POLICY CENTRE, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS,
(2004). On the interests in China model, see Suisheng Zhao, The China Model: Can It
Replace the Western Model of Modernization? 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 437 (2010).
142. Michael Wesley, Made in China, GRIFFITH REVIEW: AFTER THE CRISIS, Sep. 29,
2009, http://griffithreview.com/edition-25-after-the-crisis/made-in-china. According to
Wesley, the saying is: ―In 1921, only socialism could save China. In 1978, only capitalism
could save China. In 1991, only China could save socialism. In 2009, only China can save
capitalism.‖
143. Zhanshi Fuzenren Daguo Xingxiang [Demonstrating the Image of a Responsible
Power], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE‘S DAILY], Mar. 30, 2009, at 3.
144. “Lilun Baquan” Geng Zhide Jingti [“Conceptual Hegemony” More Threatening],
RENMIN LUNTAN [PEOPLE‘S FORUM], Mar. 1, 2009, at 13.
145. Wang Chen, Zai “Zhong‟guo Renquan Lilun yu Shijian de Fazhan he Chuangxin”
Lilun Yantaohui shang de Jianghua [Speech at the Conference on Development and
Innovation in China‟s Human Rights Theories and Practice], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE‘S
DAILY], Aug. 26, 2011, at 8.
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build China‘s human rights conceptual framework, so as to
respond to critiques of human rights conditions in China,
gain more understanding and recognition of China‘s
progress in human rights, defend China‘s ideological
security and national security by preventing intellectual
infiltration by Western hostile sources.146
Clearly, in this national strategy, ―soft power‖ is deployed as a
mobilizing slogan to rally support of the Party/State establishment
and reclaim legitimacy by presenting a Chinese alternative to the
Western models. Human rights was clearly part of this development.
Despite its many efforts, however, it is still too early to tell if
China can invent a totally different conceptual framework that can
justify its current practice and, in the meantime, justify its critiques of
the existing hegemon.147 The empty chair at the Nobel Peace Prize
ceremony in December 2010 seems to suggest the formidable
challenge for such a conceptual ―innovation.‖ What is clear, however,
is that as a mobilization tool, ―soft power‖ is heavily dependent on a
discursive logic based on at least some shared understandings.148
Conservative thinkers like Eric Posner and John Yoo noted China‘s
endeavors to present the Chinese alternative, but that is only one side
of the story.149 What they failed to see is that, in order to be
convincing, ―soft power‖ is compelled by their own logic to base
their arguments on a common ground with those of the current
hegemon. It was for this reason that China was inescapably drawn to
the international norms in its critique of the Iraq war, Guantánamo,
and Abu Ghraib; and it will continue to do so as long as it still has
―soft power‖ in mind. Identity-based rhetoric fails to recognize that
human rights discourse is a two-way communication in which the
other side is eager to talk back.

146. Id. at 8.
147. Joseph S. Nye Jr., China Undoes Its Charm Offensive, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2011,
at A17; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Op-ed., Why China Is Weak on Soft Power, INT‘L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 18, 2012. China has invested heavily in this area. See DAVID M. LAMPTON, THE THREE
FACES OF CHINESE POWER: MIGHT, MONEY AND MINDS 137–63 (2008); JOSHUA
KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: HOW CHINA‘S SOFT POWER IS TRANSFORMING THE
WORLD (2007).
148. ―Shared understanding‖ is a key element of interactional theory of international law.
See BURNNÉE & TOOPE, LEGITIMACY, supra note 83, ch. 2.
149. See generally Posner & Yoo, supra note 93.
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CONCLUSION
By the end of 2011 (when this article was written), it is still hard
to conclude that the ―era‖ of the Iraq War is over. It is true that on
December 15, the last American troops withdrew from Iraq. The
American troops, however, did not leave the region in anticipation of
the growing tension with Iran, which is allegedly developing
weapons of mass destruction.150 Guantánamo is yet to be closed, and
some speculate that it may stay open for quite a while.151 The debate
on torture is far from over. President Barak Obama ordered the end of
―enhanced interrogation techniques‖ but decided not to prosecute
violations of federal criminal law.152 A survey of the independent
voters in May 2011 suggested that a large proportion of them were in
favor of the ―enhanced interrogation techniques.‖153 In the
Republican Party‘s primaries in 2011, none of the presidential
candidates disapproved of water boarding.154
Martti Koskenniemi made a point in 2003 on argumentation of
norms in international law155 that can further shed light on this point.
Koskenniemi observed that international actors routinely challenge
each other by invoking legal rules and principles on which they have
projected meanings that support their own preferences and counteract
those of their opponents.156 Often hegemonic powers also dominate
international law through these kinds of contestations. But this does
not render legal discourse meaningless. This is because there are
some fundamental rules in legal discourse that even the hegemon is
not free to break:
Engaging in legal discourse, persons recognize each other
as carriers of rights and duties who are entitled to benefits
from or who owe obligation to each other not because of

150. Dangerous Tension with Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2012, at A22.
151. Editorial, Guantánamo‟s Next Decade, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2012, at A19.
152. Kenneth Roth, Op-Ed., Torture We Can‟t Ignore, WASH. POST, Jul. 12, 2011, at A17;
Mark J. McKeon, Why We Must Prosecute: Torture Is a Breach Of International Law,
WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2009, at 23. But see Cheney Offers Sharp Defense of C.I.A.
Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, at A1.
153. Some Call It Torture. In One Poll, Most Call It Justified, WASH. POST, May 18,
2011, at A2. The killing of Bin Laden even resurrected the debate on the use of torture.
Laden Raid Revives Debate on Value of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A1.
154. Editorial, The Torture Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A30.
155. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17
CAMB. REV. INT‘L AFF. 199 (2004). Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War
against Terrorism and Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 241 (2003).
156. Koskenniemi, supra note 155, at 199.
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charity or interest but because such rights or duties belong
to every member of the community in that position.157
In the human rights discourse, it is a particularly intriguing test
when the challenges came from a ―right-thinking highwayman‖ that
has its own questionable record, because the highwayman may well
have some inside knowledge about the gunman. And so does the
gunman about the highwayman. It is exactly their finger-pointing to
each other that provides the best moments for outside observers to
make sense of what is going on. In other words, it is not this
―attitude‖ or that ―attitude‖ toward human rights that is true or
interesting; taken in isolation, neither ―attitude‖ offers any
meaningful information. It is the interactive process that sheds the
most light on the meanings of both. This is like the complex words
that William Empson, the English linguist, has most brilliantly
discussed. Empson explained that the true meaning of a complex
word such as a pun or a metaphor only ―occurs when two ideas,
which are connected only by being both relevant in the context, can
be given in one word simultaneously.‖158
The identity-based rhetoric is deployed to obscure the situation
by shifting the focus of attention on the questionable record to
destroy the creditability of such a highwayman, so that there is no
need to listen to what he has to say about what the gunman did. John
Fairbank noted in his ―Assignment for the 70‘s‖ speech that ―China is
the most pronounced case of ‗otherness‘ on which we need
perspective.‖159 That statement still seems true in 2011. But he was
quite mistaken in believing that we just need more information about
China. Today, information about China abounds, in the media,
executive boardrooms, conferences, academic journals, and seminars.
Contemporary studies have forcefully demonstrated that China‘s
international behavior is not different from that of other countries, or
even shows more consistency than that of the United States in the era
of the Iraq War.160 This is exactly what earlier critics none other than
157. Koskenniemi, supra note 155, at 214.
158. WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY 102 (2d ed. 1966).
159. John K. Fairbank, Assignment for the 70‟s, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 861 (1969).
160. For example, in a recent study of China‘s and United States‘ behavior in global order
related areas—use of force, macroeconomic policy surveillance, non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, climate change, and financial regulation—Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter
came to the conclusion that ―[s]ince the reform era, China has moved from a position of
generally low behavioral consistency towards gradually higher levels in the majority of the
areas covered in this study.‖ ROSEMARY FOOT & ANDREW WALTER, CHINA, THE UNITED
STATES, AND GLOBAL ORDER 275 (2010). The two scholars noted, however, that ―[t]here has
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R. Randall Edwards had argued in 1963.161 Nevertheless, more
information does not mitigate China‘s ―otherness.‖ The key is not
―attitude‖ itself; rather, it is the attitude in the talk of the other‘s
attitude—a phenomenology of ―attitude‖—that has been missing.
In this context, one great benefit in rereading Chiu‘s articles
from the 1966–1968 period, once his struggles are made more
explicit, is to learn from his sensibility and reflective selfquestioning. His own background—family, political or intellectual—
gave him no reason to identify with or even to be sympathetic to
Mao‘s China. So he started with the question of Communist China‘s
attitude toward international law—a religious fever of the Vietnam
War Era. The inquiry, however, led to doubts. Chiu‘s two associates,
Jerome A. Cohen and R. Randall Edwards, who confronted the
―attitude‖ question more directly, helped him develop the doubts. The
doubts became so clear that the experts who were invited to the 1966
Senate Foreign Relations Committee—many of whom were
politically conservative, some even hawkish—voiced their concerns
by revealing the absurdity of the Johnson Administration‘s perception
of China. That ability of self-questioning, though not lost in area
studies,162 must be revitalized time and again to continue the
dialogue, because resorting to identity—―who we are‖ or ―who they
are‖—is seductively tempting and simple. Just as in language, we are
inclined to find meaning ―in‖ the word itself. William Empson
complained, ―There is a main puzzle for the linguist about how much
been no similar trend towards rising levels of behavorial consistency in the case of the
United States, where the picture is much more mixed.‖ Id. at 275. Among non-China
specialists, Professor G. John Ikenberry notes that China ―is increasingly working within,
rather than outside of, the Western order.‖ G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the
Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? FOREIGN AFF., May–Jun. 2011, at 32,
32.
161. See supra text accompanying note 21.
162. E.g., William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental: Roberto Unger‟s Use and
Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEX. L. REV. 915 (1986); William P. Alford, Of Arsenic and
Old Laws: Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in Late Imperial China, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1180
(1984); William P. Alford, On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law, 61
WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986). Subsequent developments include PHILIP C. C. HUANG, CODE,
CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC COMPARED (2001);
PHILIP C. C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE QING
(1996); MARK A. ALLEE, LAW AND LOCAL SOCIETY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA: NORTHERN
TAIWAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994); Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of
Property in Prewar China, in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 17–36
(Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko & Robert Gardella eds. 2004). On earlier legal history
see, Karen Turner, The Theory of Law in the Ching-fa, 14 EARLY CHINA 55 (1989); Karen
Turner, Rule of Law Ideas in Early China? 6 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1992); R. P. Peerenboom,
Natural Law in the “Huang-Lao Boshu,” 40 PHIL. E. & W. 309 (1990).
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is ‗in‘ a word and how much in the general purpose of those who use
it, but it is this shrubbery, a social and not very conscious matter . . .
that one would expect to find only able to survive because somehow
inherent in their words.‖163

163. WILLIAM EMPSON, THE STRUCTURE OF COMPLEX WORDS 158 (2d ed. 1989).

